

San Diego Fire-Rescue Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations

Purpose	The purpose of this Concept of Operations is to address potential issues associated with acts of terrorism occurring within the City of San Diego. The specific focus of this document is to address the roles, responsibilities and actions to be taken by the San Diego Fire-Rescue Department. The intent is to reduce the loss of life, damage to property, and damage to the environment should such an attack take place.
Scope	This guide provides direction to this department and other City departments involved in protecting public safety and preparing for and responding to terrorist events. It includes guidelines for notification, coordination and leadership of response operations, supporting operations, and emergency public information. This document is to be used in conjunction with, not supercede, other plans and manuals already in place by this department and the Office of Homeland Security.
Objectives	 Provide a platform for establishing and maintaining a current and realistic assessment of the potential threat of terrorism in the City of San Diego. Provide planning, response, and recovery guidance which is consistent with National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the President's policy on terrorism, Presidential Decision Directive 39, (PPD-39). Provide a basis for identifying needed training of personnel and exercising of local, state, and federal capabilities for responding to terrorist events. Continue to foster working relationships with other City departments and outside agencies to share operational strategies and intelligence.

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Threat Analysis

The attack on the World Trade Center Building in New York City, on February 26, 1993 and September 11, 2001, Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, Pentagon on September 11, 2001, and Flight 93 in rural Pennsylvania on the same day shocked the nation into the reality that there are no domestic safe havens from acts of terrorism. These events brought to center stage our nation's vulnerability, and highlight California's risk, and specifically, San Diego's risk, of similar attacks against public officials, private and multi-national corporations, public infrastructure, and government facilities.

The events on September 11, 2001 demonstrate that international terrorist groups have the potential to operate with deadly effectiveness in this country. Such groups may offer no allegiance to any particular country but seek political or personal objectives that transcend national/state boundaries.

There is concern that the attacks that took place in Tokyo, New York City, and Oklahoma City could occur in San Diego. A terrorist acting alone or in concert with any of the known national or international groups could readily commit acts of terrorism here. The open availability of basic "off the shelf" type chemicals and mail order biological research materials, coupled with an access to even the crudest laboratory facilities, could enable the individual extremist or an organized terrorist faction to manufacture proven highly lethal substances or to fashion less sophisticated weapons of mass destruction. The use of such weapons could result in mass casualties, long term contamination, and wreak havoc to local, state, and national economies.

The freedom of movement and virtually unrestricted access to government officials, buildings, and critical infrastructure afforded to California's citizens and foreign visitors, presents the terrorist with the opportunity and conditions of anonymity to deliver such devastation and its tragic consequences with only the crudest devices of nuclear, chemical, or biological content. Given San Diego's proximity to the international border, open approach from the Pacific Ocean, high military concentration, and varied industrial base serve to make this city a viable target.

Pre-Planned Events

City Emergency Planners realize there are events that occur that may prove to be at risk for possible terrorist action. Examples include political conventions and major sporting events. The City of San Diego is committed to taking necessary measures to prevent or minimize the potential consequences of these acts. Utilizing proper channels, the Mayor can request the Governor to exercise authority under the Emergency Services Act, section 8570, to plan for, procure, and pre-position supplies, medicines, materials, and equipment to mitigate the possible effects of an emergency. Once notified, the Governor may also take other preparatory steps, including the partial or full activation of emergency

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organizations in advance of an actual emergency [Emergency Services Act, Government Code Section 8570(j)].

Response to Terrorism

Terrorist incidents create a unique environment in which to manage emergency response. In the event an act of terrorism occurs in the City of San Diego, Police and Fire will be first on scene exercising responsibility for protecting public health and safety. The two departments will manage all aspects of the incident until the FBI assumes command, by virtue of its legal authority. Working in conjunction with SDPD, the FBI will coordinate operations relating to identifying, apprehending, and neutralizing the terrorists and their weapons. Both Fire and Police will always maintain control of their response resources and adhere to a Unified Command structure. It is probable a number of other outside agencies will be involved in the response. Appendix E (page 55) lists likely agency participants and twenty-four hour contact telephone numbers.

Readiness and Response Phases

There are five readiness / response phases that apply to preparing for and responding to terrorist acts: Preparedness, Increased Readiness, Alert, Response, and Recovery. Although progressive, conditions may require cycles of escalation and de-escalation as well as skipping a phase or phases. The decision to initiate activities within any of these phases will be made by the Fire Chief or designee, in response to conditions within the City of San Diego. The readiness / response phases and related activities are as follows:

Preparedness

In this phase, SDFD has no information indicating an increased threat. Routine activities to be conducted include:

- Ensure the Operational readiness and security of the DOC.
- Review, update and enhance phone rosters, emergency plans, and interagency procedures.
- Maintain/update data in the County Alert Service System (CASS) for alert and notification of MAST/EOD, US&R, IMT, MMST and DOC staff.
- Evaluate and test equipment and procedures.
- Develop/revise emergency notification procedures and checklists.
- Conduct on-going training and exercises department wide.

This level correlates to the U. S. Department of Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) Conditions **Green**, "Low Risk", or **Blue**, "Guarded".

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Increased Readiness

This phase is based on information from the San Diego Police Department's Criminal Intelligence Unit, San Diego Terrorism Early Warning Group, FBI, DHS, State OES or other credible source that a potential threat <u>may</u> exist. Implementation of this phase could occur upon receipt of an uncorroborated threat to Southern California and / or the San Diego Region.

Upon making this determination, the following actions occur:

- The City Office of Homeland Security activates this phase and notifies FCC.
- FCC makes appropriate internal notifications.
- No EOC or DOC activations are required.
- Special Operations staff will monitor pertinent news and media coverage.
- Notifications will be made as appropriate.
- Special Operations staff will maintain a detailed log of all related activities.

This level correlates to U. S. Department of Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) Conditions **Yellow**, "Elevated" or **Orange**, "High" Risk of Terrorist Attack with <u>no confirmed threat</u> to Southern California or the San Diego region.

Alert

On receipt of a credible threat that may significantly impact the City of San Diego, the following actions are taken:

- The City Director of Homeland Security activates this phase upon receipt and confirmation of the HSAS change to Orange or Red, <u>with a specific threat</u> to Southern California or the San Diego Region.
- The DOC may be activated at Level I or II.
- If the DOC is to be activated, use the CASS to notify staff.
- Notification of the DOC activation is made to the City Office of Homeland Security.
- Coordinate with the Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEWG) and SDPD Criminal Intelligence Unit to obtain an assessment of the impact the condition has on the City of San Diego.
- Assign HIRT and MAST/EOD to review WMD agents, possible effects and potential resource requests and identify the type of WMD involved, if possible. Determine the availability of resources, quantities needed and potential sites for pre-staging.



This level correlates to U. S. Department of Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) Conditions **Orange**, "High" or **Red**, "Severe" Risk Of Terrorist Attack <u>with a confirmed threat</u> to Southern California or the San Diego Region.

Response

In this phase, an actual incident has occurred that impacts the City of San Diego. The City EOC and SDFD DOC are activated. In this phase, the following actions are taken:

- Appropriate units are dispatched to the scene or multiple scenes in accordance with department protocols.
- The DOC will be activated at Level II or III at the discretion of the DOC Director. (Refer to the DOC Operations Manual for activation concerns)

The following response guidelines were taken out of the Department Operations Manual, Standard Instruction 02, Section XVI, Item B (Special Response Considerations) pages 3–8:

- 2. First Responder Priorities
 - a. Size-up
 - 1. Recognize incident as a terrorist attack.
 - 2. Identify incident problem(s) rescue, mass casualty, fire suppression, Haz Mat, explosive device, structural collapse, SWAT / STAR PM, criminal activity.
 - 3. Assess the vulnerability of crews and consider relocating before allowing any members to leave the apparatus or enter the scene. All personnel should don the appropriate level of PPE for the potential exposure(s). This may include the WMD PPE and /or an SCBA in operation.
 - 4. If the incident is recognized as being a potential terrorist event after first responders (operations level or "FRO") personnel have unknowingly entered a contaminated area, they should immediately retreat to a safe refuge area and request assistance for emergency decontamination prior to the removal of any PPE (keep SCBA in operation).

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- 5. Transmit a brief radio report describing the situation, initial actions taken and requests for additional resources. To communicate this as a potential terrorist incident, include the following statement: "San Diego, This is a CODE-T Incident." The initial resource request should include, but is not limited to:
 - a. Medical Multi-Casualty
 - b. Hazardous Materials Incident Response Team (HIRT)
 - c. MAST/Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
 - d. US&R
 - e. Heavy Rescue
 - f. MMST
 - g. Incident Management Team (IMT)
 - h. SDPD
 - i. FBI-San Diego
- b. Limited by their PPE and training, FRO personnel will be restricted to performing activities outside the exclusion (hot) zone throughout the duration of the incident.
- c. A significant challenge will be the likely confrontation with panicked citizens leaving the site who approach any emergency vehicle and demand help from the responders. To the extent possible, FRO personnel should limit their interaction with ambulatory victims who come to them. The public address (PA) system will be very useful in directing these citizens toward the area selected for Mass Casualty Decontamination.
- d. Relocate to a suitable location and set up for a Mass Casualty Decontamination evolution, directing incoming resources via safest route (wind direction a primary factor) to sustain this operation and to augment it at additional locations if needed. Activate Annex D (Multi-Casualty Incident Plan).
- e. Assess collateral hazards secondary device, potential for additional attack, possibility of suspect being among the victims.
- f. Deploy apparatus and personnel to maximize protection factors (i.e., minimize exposure).



- 1. Time in affected area to be minimized.
- 2. Distance from affected area lengthened to reduce direct involvement with casualties (position Upwind, Uphill and Away). Ensuring sufficient distance from the site may be the most important tactical consideration.
- 3. Shielding from affected area (apparatus, other buildings, personal protective equipment)
- g. Identify locations for the Incident Command Post (ICP) and Staging. Incoming resources should be limited from coming directly into the unsecured scene until they are assigned.

C. <u>Command and Control</u>

- 1. Ensure notification and response by SDPD and FBI to the ICP.
- 2. Establish and declare "Unified Command" early, starting with the first law enforcement officer to report to the ICP. Anticipate the need to liaison with representatives from several agencies.
 - a. The FBI is designated as the lead federal agency for any incident recognized as being potentially terrorist-related, and will be the on-scene commander for the coordination of the U.S. Government response.
 - b. Upon arrival at scene and after receiving a briefing from Command, the FBI has the authority to, and may, assume IC in a Unified Command structure with SDPD and SDFD as well as representatives from other agencies.
- 3. Incident Command Post

It is recommended that the ICP and Staging not be in line of sight with the incident scene. The location should be upwind and upslope.

Respiratory protection for all personnel in the ICP should be readily available. This may include SCBA and/or Air Purifying Respirators (APRs). In the event breathing apparatus is required, ensure measures are in place to continuously monitor air quality in the area.

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- 4. Security (provided / coordinated by SDPD or other jurisdictional law enforcement agency)
 - a. Ensure sweeps are conducted immediately of ICP, Staging and other areas of operation for any possible secondary devices, and that these sites are kept secure from unauthorized persons. If any suspicious objects are found, this becomes the priority issue and is the responsibility of MAST/EOD to evaluate and employ render-safe procedures as may be appropriate.
 - b. Ensure that perimeter lines are established, to keep onlookers out and also to keep those leaving the venue / affected area from leaving the scene. SDPD will endeavor to keep people, who intend to leave the controlled area, inside this perimeter. However, police will not use force unless authorized under a declaration of a "Public Health Emergency" by the county Health Officer.
- Ensure response notification of specialty unit resources relative to the type of incident, including HIRT, MAST/EOD, US&R, Heavy Rescue, SDPD SWAT/STAR PM, the county Metropolitan Medical Strike Team, and FBI-San Diego WMD Haz Mat Response Team.
- 6. Attempt to establish liaison with venue representative. Essential information to be obtained may include, but is not limited to the following:
 - a. Number of occupants; employees and visitors.
 - Exit locations, considering flow of occupants and where large numbers of people are likely to congregate outside. Also consider best ingress / egress route(s) for entry / rescue teams.
 - c. In-place features that could be utilized to advantage:
 - Public Address System; areas covered, location of microphones.
 - (2) HVAC System air intake and exhaust locations; control options.
 - (3) Video Surveillance System; areas covered, location of monitor(s).



- 7. Plan for sufficient area to conduct Mass Casualty Decontamination, Triage, Treatment and Transport.
- 8. Establish a Medical Branch and activate Annex D. Ensure the development of a Transportation Plan to allow for efficient staging, patient loading, and transport out of the scene by ambulances.
- 9. Consider requesting through FCC that air space over the incident be closed by FAA. This will prevent an unintentional spread of any hazardous vapor plume, and will also reduce noise levels for entry operations requiring listening acuity.
- 10. Consult the Field Operations Guide to ensure ICS areas of responsibility are covered. Direct the Planning Section Chief to develop a Demobilization Plan at the appropriate time.

D. <u>Command Transition</u>

- 1. During the response phase of a terrorist incident, overall command and control generally resides with the Fire Incident Commander (FBI always retains authority to assume IC).
- 2. After all victims have been removed from danger (rescue, decontamination and field treatment) and hazards have been sufficiently abated, Unified Command will continue with the FBI-SAC (Special Agent in Charge) or designee assuming Command.

E. <u>Metropolitan Medical Strike Team (MMST)</u>

1. Overview

The MMST is a unique response asset specifically designed to address terrorist incidents involving WMD, primarily those where chemical and or radiological agent(s) have been suspected of being used. It will augment existing field medical, law enforcement, Haz Mat, ordnance disposal, mass decontamination operations, and provide medical information and consultation to the IC and affected hospitals. The MMST will focus its efforts on:

- a. Exclusion Zone Reconnaissance.
- b. Agent identification.
- c. Safe extraction and decontamination of non-ambulatory victims. Ambulatory victims remain the responsibility of the first responders (police, fire and EMS personnel) to



control, decontaminate, triage and treat through a separate corridor of operations.

- d. Triage and primary treatment including antidote administration. Specialized medications are brought to the scene by the MMST, and will be distributed as indicated to EMS personnel at both treatment areas (ambulatory and non-ambulatory).
- e. Hospital coordination.
- f. Site security (inner perimeter), evidence awareness and preservation.
- 2. Composition

The MMST is a local (San Diego County Operational Area) resource organized into the five (5) ICS elements of Command / Management, Planning and Intelligence, Operations, Logistics and Finance. The MMST Operations Section has a Law Team, a Haz Mat Team, and an EMS Team. Its members come from several agencies from throughout the county, including the on-duty resources of HIRT, MAST/EOD, STAR Medics and EMS Specialty Engine Company(ies).

There is no patient transport capability provided by the MMST. The local jurisdiction must provide ambulances or other alternative means of patient transport.

3. Integration into the incident

As many members of the MMST will likely be part of the initial response, a transition occurs as the incident progresses and the additional MMST staffing becomes assembled. Following a briefing from the IC, the MMST Task Force Leader (TFL) will be the supervisor of all elements within this team, and will report to the incident Operations Section Chief. Essentially, the MMST becomes a single resource under which all specialized operations (except technical/heavy rescue) are organized.

This transition requires a clear understanding of which resources will change their line of reporting from the IC or other subordinate leader to the MMST TFL. It may also necessitate the disengagement of specialized resources from existing assignments, requiring coordination to ensure continuity of operations. These

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resources include units from both SDFD (HIRT, MAST/EOD and EMS [STAR medics and at least one EMS specialty engine company]) and SDPD (SWAT), requiring close liaison between fire and law in the Unified Command Post to facilitate this transition.

As the MMST becomes staffed and operational, it can reinforce and sustain hot zone entry activities (if any) that have been initiated by HIRT. Security concerns may preclude any such activities until a multi-disciplinary entry team approach can be assembled.

F. Off-Site Consequences

It is likely that significant numbers of people may leave the affected venue prior to the establishment of any scene control which would restrict their egress. Some may suffer delayed affects and become casualties, each requiring a response to a location remote from the original scene (roadway / freeway, home, etc.). Others may self-refer to hospitals covering a wide region. Any of these patients challenge response personnel and hospital emergency departments with the prospect of being potentially contaminated.

The capability of managing contaminated patients varies widely among these institutions. Depending upon the numbers of such patients, the perceived extent of possible contamination and the in-house capability at any given hospital, requests for assistance to these facilities may become a significant impact on SDFD resources.

G. Federal Response

All local government assets including the MMST are likely to be depleted before the incident is brought to a conclusion, with the potential for activities continuing beyond the first operational period (12 hours). Several federal assets are available to assist with the response and recovery phases of a terrorist incident.

Recovery

Recovery is defined as the ability of an infrastructure to restart operations after a disaster. To this end, the Deputy Chief of Operations will utilize the resources of the department to accurately assess the situation. A recovery strategy will be developed and implemented. Chief Officers will be assigned to oversee the department's recovery operations. The safety and well being of Fire-Rescue personnel will continue to be the number one

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priority. Briefings will be scheduled and conducted. Appropriate notifications will be made. Crews will protect undamaged property and cooperate with investigators. Company Officers will document actions taken utilizing an ICS 214 form for each Operational Period.

Two key elements for the San Diego Fire-Rescue Department in the recovery phase include continuing to serve the citizens of the City and maintaining a positive image of the organization.

Operational Condition Levels (OPCON)

The following response guidelines were taken out of the Department Operations Manual, Standard Instruction 12, Section II, (Department Operational Condition Guidelines) pages 1–9:

II. DEPARTMENT OPERATIONAL CONDITION GUIDELINES

A. Purpose

San Diego Fire-Rescue Department (SDFD) is committed to distributing information to maximize the security and readiness of our personnel. This section provides general guidelines for deployment of resources and implementation of security measures for potential or actual terrorist threats and significant events.

B. Description

The Department Operational Conditions Guidelines give general guidelines for SDFD as an organization in the event of an OPCON implementation. The Workplace Placard system contains site specific guidelines for each workplace that may be implemented in conjunction with Department Operational Conditions Guidelines.

It is important to note that OPCON levels can vary between federal, state, and local agencies.

- 1. OPCONs are phased increases in operational readiness levels and security.
- 2. OPCONs may be initiated for terrorist threats and or attacks, natural disasters and other major emergencies.



- 3. Based on information received, the Threat Notification Officer (TNO) is responsible for determining when an OPCON level should be implemented.
- 4. All personnel are responsible for the successful implementation of an OPCON level.
- C. Label and Color Code System

The Operational Condition Guideline System uses a combination of color and text to represent the different Operational Condition Levels in the system. This is loosely based on the general concept used by the Federal Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The department's system is divided into two general parts. The first part of the system is a set of general guidelines for the entire department, and the second part is a specific set of tasks for each worksite within the department.

Within each section, each condition level in the system is displayed on a separate page within this document. Each page has a legend of all the Operational Conditions as a reference, a color text box that lists the Operational Condition Level and a short text description of that level, and a checklist that lists actions that are required to take place.

1. General Operation Guidelines Description

This is a set of instructions for the department as a whole to follow for each OPCON Level.

- a. Protective Measures Activated: This is a checklist of measures to take at each level.
- b. Actions: Actions that are to be completed as soon as possible after going to that OPCON Level.
- 2. Workplace Specific Operational Condition Guidelines

This is a set of instructions for each specific type of worksite in the department for each OPCON Level.

- a. Tasks: The specific tasks that are required to be performed at each OPCON level for that worksite.
- b. Responsible Party: Who is responsible for performing or supervising the performance of the required tasks. Each



party is responsible for ensuring that those listed before them have performed their tasks.

- 3. Operational Condition Guideline Levels of Activation
 - a. LOW (MARSEC 1)
 - Color: Green
 - Description: A low risk of terrorist threat
 - b. GUARDED (MARSEC 1)
 - Color: Blue
 - Description: General threat of possible terrorist activity, violent protests or other significant event
 - c. ELEVATED (MARSEC 1)
 - Color: Yellow
 - Description: Specific threat of possible terrorist activity, violent protests or other significant event
 - d. HIGH (MARSEC 2)
 - Color: Orange
 - Description: An imminent likelihood of terrorist activity, violent protests, or other significant event
 - e. SEVERE (MARSEC 3)
 - Color: Red
 - Description: A terrorist attack, violent protest, or other significant event has or is occurring




SAN DIEGO FIRE-RESCUE

GENERAL

OPERATIONAL CONDITION

GUIDELINES





•	LOW MARSEC 1	GUARDED MARSEC 1	ELEVAT Marsec		SEVERE MARSEC 3	Commented [c2]: Changed to reflect revised terminology
	LOW MARSEC 1 Low Risk of Terrorist Threat				Commented [c3]: Changed to reflect revised terminology	
	Protective N	Aeasures Activate	d	Action	ns	
	 Day to Day Standard Operating Procedures All personnel, not in uniform, are required to display their FD or City ID card while on duty or at work 		, are			Commented [dw4]: Add 1. Day to Day Standard Operating Procedures

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LOW	GUARDED	ELEVATED	<u>HIGH</u>	SEVERE
MARSEC 1	MARSEC 1	MARSEC 1	MARSEC 2	MARSEC 3

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GUARDED MARSEC 1 General threat of possible terrorist activity, violent protests or other significant event				Commente	
		Protective Measures Activated		Actions	
	1.	All personnel, not in uniform, are required to display their FD or City		Personnel conduct regular duties	
	2.	ID card while on duty or at work Note and report suspicious circumstances and activity		Establish liaison with Federal, State and local agencies to evaluate threat	
	3.	Ensure building and vehicle security		Senior Staff briefed on details of the threat or significant activity	
	4.	Escort all visitors and unauthorized personnel in stations or other SDFD facilities			
	5.	Exercise caution during emergency response			
	6.	Review Pre-fire plans of potential targets in likely response areas			

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	LO MARSI			Commented [c8]: Changed to reflect revised terminology
s	pecif	ELEV/ MARS fic threat of possible	Commented [c9]: Changed to reflect revised terminology	
		protests or other	significant event	
	Prot	tective Measures Activated	Actions	
	re	ll personnel, not in uniform, are equired to display their FD or City O card while on duty or at work	 Personnel conduct regular duties Establish liaison with Federal, State and 	
	2. In m	nplement physical security leasures for facilities and	local agencies to evaluate threat	
	3. No ci	nergency vehicles ote and report suspicious ircumstances and activity limit ublic access to sites as information	Senior Staff briefed on details of the threat or significant activity	
		ictates nsure building and vehicle security	All Officers notified of potential problem/threat	Commented [dw10]: Recommend adding qualifying text (red text) to make applicable to current status.
	pe	scort all visitors and unauthorized ersonnel in stations or other SDFD icilities	Landar	
	6. Ez	xercise caution during emergency		
	7. Re	eview Pre-fire plans of potential		
	8. In m	rgets in likely response areas nplement physical security leasures for facilities and		
	9. Li	nergency vehicles imit public access to sites and formation dictates		
		nsure callback lists are current		

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	HIC MARS <u>mminent</u> likelihood of terror other signif Protective Measures Activated	SEC 2	Commented [c12]: Changed to reflect revised terminology
	<u>mminent</u> likelihood of terror other signif	ist activity, violent protests, or	
	Protective Measures Activated		
		Actions	
□ 1.	All personnel, not in uniform, are	Personnel conduct regular duties	
□ 2.	required to display their FD or City ID card while on duty or at work Implement physical security measures for facilities and	Establish liaison with Federal, State and local agencies to evaluate threat	
□ 3.	emergency vehicles Note and report suspicious circumstances and activity limit public access to sites as information	 Senior Staff briefed on details of the threat or significant activity 	
	dictates Ensure building and vehicle security Escort all visitors and unauthorized personnel in stations or other SDFD facilities	 All Officers notified of potential problem/threat Cancel outside activities 	
D 6.	Review Pre-fire plans of potential	□ Notification to all pager groups	
□ 7.	targets in likely response areas Implement physical security measures for facilities and emergency vehicles	 Personnel remain on duty until released by the Duty Deputy Chief 	
D 8.	Limit public access to sites and information dictates	□ Institute callback procedures as needed	
	Ensure callback lists are current b. Exercise heightened caution during	 Fleet Manager insures readiness of reserve fleet DOC activated 	
D 1	emergency response 1. SDPD will provide regular patrols	□ Mutual Aid Coordinator placed on alert	
D 12	of operations support facilities 2. Restrict vehicle access and parking	Establish liaison with Federal, State and local	
D 13	near department facilities 3. Operations section to monitor	agencies to evaluate threat Storerooms 42, 42A, and 43 review inventories for	
	dispatch and response channels 4. Consider callback of Hazmat and	availability of emergency supplies	Commented [dw14]: conflicts with Field Ops placard. Add
	EOD personnel 5. Release non-uniformed personnel		"consider" to be consistent.
	from duty when approved by the Duty Division Chief		
□ 10	Uniformed personnel will have PPE accessible		
□ 17	7. Consider callback of select support personnel		



SEVERE MARSEC 3

A terrorist <u>attack</u>, violent protest, or other significant event has or is occurring

	<u> </u>		
Protective Measures Activated	Actions		
1. All personnel, not in uniform, are	Personnel conduct regular duties		
required to display their FD or City ID card while on duty or at workImplement physical security measures for facilities and	 Establish liaison with Federal, State and local agencies to evaluate threat 		
 emergency vehicles 3. Note and report suspicious circumstances and activity limit public access to sites as information dictates 	Senior Staff briefed on details of the threat or significant activity		
4. Ensure building and vehicle security	All Officers notified of potential problem/threat		
 Escort all visitors and unauthorized personnel in stations or other SDFD facilities 	Cancel outside activities		
6. Review Pre-fire plans of potential	□ Notification to all pager groups		
targets in likely response areas7. Implement physical security measures for facilities and	Personnel remain on duty until released by the Duty Deputy Chief		
emergency vehicles8. Limit public access to sites and information dictates	□ Institute callback procedures as needed		
 9. Ensure callback lists are current 	Fleet Manager insures readiness of reserve fleet		
10. Exercise heightened caution during emergency response	DOC activated		
11. SDPD will provide regular patrols of operations support facilities	Mutual Aid Coordinator placed on alert		
12. Restrict vehicle access and parking near department facilities	Establish liaison with Federal, State and local agencies to evaluate threat		
 Operations section to monitor dispatch and response channels 	 Storerooms 42, 42A, and 43 review inventories for availability of emergency supplies 		
 Release non-uniform personnel from duty when approved by the Duty Division chief 	 Mutual Aid activated as needed 		
15. Uniform personnel will have PPE accessible			

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SEVERE MARSEC 3 A terrorist <u>attack</u> , violent protest, or other significant event has or is occurring			
Protective Measures Activated	Actions		
 16. Consider callback of select support personnel 17. Implement callback of Hazmat and EOD personnel 18. Request PD security for FCC, Training, HQ, and the Repair Facility 19. Operations units pre-stage and respond in task force configuration with PD escort 20. Gate and door codes changed on facilities 21. Restrict/deny parking in controlled areas 22. Respond to emergency call only 23. Consider street closures surrounding support facilities 24. Support personnel travel in minimum two person teams with communication 			



Terrorist Incident / Change in Threat Level Notification Process

The Fire-Rescue Department will change OPCON levels based on information received from the San Diego Police Department Criminal Intelligence Unit or the FBI.

The following response guidelines were taken out of the Department Operations Manual, Standard Instruction 12, Section I, (Change in Threat Level Procedures) pages 1–8:

I. Change In Threat Level Procedures

- A. Threat Notification Officer (TNO)
 - 1. The Chief Officer who will act as the San Diego Fire-Rescue liaison to receive and process the threat notification.
 - Primary: Deputy Chief of Special Operations
 - 1st Alternate: Deputy Chief of Operations
 - 2nd Alternate: Duty Deputy Chief
 - 2. FCC pages the Threat Notification Officer (Deputy Chief of Special Operations) to call the FCC for an "Urgent" message from the FBI or a change in the threat level. In the event the Deputy Chief of Special Operations does not call within ten minutes, FCC will page the Operations Chief during business hours, or the Duty Deputy Chief after hours with the same message.
 - 3. Once contacted as the Threat Notification Officer (TNO), that Chief Officer will contact the FCC immediately and assume responsibility for ensuring all procedures in this Special Instruction are carried out in a timely and judicious manner until completion.
- B. Change in Threat Level
 - 1. <u>Receipt of Local Terrorism / Threat Information Report</u>
 - a. Description

Notification from law enforcement of a threat of possible terrorist activity; violent protest or other significant activity to the City of San Diego or the region.



b. Purpose

To ensure an appropriate measured reaction by San Diego Fire-Rescue by notifying a designated member of Senior Staff.

c. Point of Contact (POC)

Fire Communications has been designated as the primary point of contact for the department to receive and disseminate credible reports of terrorism from the FBI.

2. <u>Receipt of Local Terrorism / Threat Information Procedures</u>

The following procedures are to be utilized by the FBI, Fire Communications Center (FCC) and other Fire-Rescue staff to assure a timely exchange and follow up on the threat information received:

- a. FBI liaison calls FCC (858 974-9889 or 9891) and provides their name and callback telephone number to be passed on to the Threat Notification Officer (TNO). When appropriate, concurrent calls will be placed by the FBI to the San Diego Police Department Watch Commander and the Director of Homeland Security.
- b. FCC pages the Threat Notification Officer (Deputy Chief of Special Operations) to call the FCC for an "Urgent" message from the FBI. In the event the Deputy Chief of Special Operations does not call within ten minutes, FCC will page the Operations Chief during business hours, or the Duty Deputy Chief after hours with the same message.
- c. The Threat Notification Officer calls the FCC to obtain the FBI liaison's name and callback telephone number.
- d. The Threat Notification Officer contacts the FBI to get a report on the following, if known:
 - Source of the information
 - Threat element (who)
 - Nature of the threat
 - Target
 - Time of the attack/event



- Estimated impact of the attack/event
- Actions taken by outside agencies
- e. The Threat Notification Officer contacts the City Homeland Security Director to share the information, ascertain the City-wide OPCON threat level, whether it has changed and any actions being taken.
- f. The Threat Notification Officer contacts the San Diego Police Department's Watch Commander at (619) 531-2205 to share the information if necessary and to receive information on actions taken, if any.
- g. The Threat Notification Officer evaluates the information provided and determines if any reaction by Fire-Rescue is necessary.
- h. If deemed appropriate, the Fire Chief, Assistant Fire Chiefs and Duty Deputy Chief will receive a briefing. The format will be as follows:
 - Source of the information
 - Threat element (who)
 - Nature of the threat
 - Target
 - Time of the attack/event
 - Estimated impact of the attack/event
 - Actions taken by outside agencies
 - National Threat Level
 - Recommended actions for SDFD
 - Recommended OPCON Level for SDFD as a whole, or by division
- Once it has been determined what actions are to be taken, the Threat Notification Officer initiates the Workforce Notification Process (see Operations Manual SI 12, Section I.B) to ensure the leadership and workforce are aware of the local threat and the departments OPCON level.

Fire-Rescue Reaction Examples

• Discuss action(s) to be initiated with the SDPD Duty Assistant Chief (contact made through SDPD Watch Commander's Office at (619) 531-2205) to ensure



consistency throughout the City and determine who will make specific notifications.

- Increase Fire-Rescue's OPCON level (Operations Manual SI 12, Section II)
- Make necessary notifications on OPCON level changes and ensure appropriate actions are taken.
- Activate the Department Operations Center (DOC).
- In conjunction with the SDPD Duty Assistant Chief, continue to monitor the situation taking into account additional FBI input and media reports.
- Initiate further action(s) based on changing needs.
- 3. <u>Change in the National Threat Level</u>

The following procedures are to be followed in the event the U. S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) changes the National Threat Level. The method of receipt could be by one of many avenues; official notification via the DHS, notification by California OES, a national news conference, etc. The following procedures are to be followed anytime the National Threat Level is raised or lowered. The person initiating the notification could be anyone in the department. It is encouraged for anyone who has become aware of the change in National Threat Level by following these procedures.

- a. The person initiating the notification process is to contact the FCC and inform them of the change in the national threat level. They will provide the FCC with the following information:
 - Their Name, Rank, Station/Division and location
 - A telephone number at which they can be immediately contacted
 - What the Threat Level is being changed to
 - What their source of information is
 - Any information regarding the threat that initiated the change in the threat level
- FCC pages the Threat Notification Officer (Deputy Chief of Special Operations) to call the FCC for an "Urgent" message regarding a change in the National Threat Level. In the event the Deputy Chief of Special Operations does not call within ten minutes, FCC will page the Operations



Chief during business hours, or the Duty Deputy Chief after hours with the same message.

- c. The Threat Notification Officer calls the FCC to obtain the employee's name, callback telephone number and pertinent information about the national threat level change.
- d. The Threat Notification Officer contacts the employee to get a report on the following:
 - Their Name, Rank, Station/Division and location
 - A telephone number they can be contacted at immediately
 - What the Threat Level is being changed to
 - What their source of information is
 - Any information regarding the threat that initiated the change in the threat level
 - Source of the information
 - Threat element (who)
 - Nature of the threat
 - Target
 - Time of the attack/event
 - Estimated impact of the attack/event
- e. The Threat Notification Officer independently confirms the information provided by the employee.
- f. If the information proves to be valid and credible, the Threat Notification Officer contacts the City Homeland Security Director to share the information, ascertain the City-wide OPCON threat level, whether it has changed and any actions being taken.
- g. The Threat Notification Officer contacts the San Diego Police Department's Watch Commander at (619) 531-2205 to share the information if necessary and to receive information on actions taken, if any.
- h. The Threat Notification Officer evaluates the information provided and determines if any reaction by Fire-Rescue is necessary.
- i. If deemed appropriate, the Fire Chief, Assistant Fire Chiefs and Duty Deputy Chief will receive a briefing. The format will be as follows:



- The updated National Threat Level
- Source of the information
- Threat element (who)
- Nature of the threat
- Target
- Time of the attack/event
- Estimated impact of the attack/event
- Actions taken by outside agencies
- Recommended actions for SDFD
- Recommended OPCON Level for SDFD as a whole, or by division
- j. Once it has been determined what actions are to be taken, the Threat Notification Officer initiates the Workforce Notification Process (see SECT. I.C.) to ensure the leadership and workforce are aware of the National Threat Level and the departments OPCON level.

C. <u>Threat Level Workforce Notification Procedures</u>

The intent of these procedures is to ensure that the entire workforce is kept informed on the current National Threat Level, the City-wide OPCON Level, San Diego Fire-Rescue's OPCON Level, and what OPCON level each division in the department will operate at under the current conditions.

- It will be the responsibility of the Threat Notification Officer (TNO) to ensure the Fire Chief, Senior Staff, and the workforce has been notified of any change in the National Threat Level or San Diego Fire-Rescue OPCON Level. The designated Threat Notification Officer will be the Deputy Chief of Special Operations. If the Deputy Chief of Special Operations is not available the first alternate will be the Deputy Chief of Operations, the second alternate will be the Duty Deputy Chief.
- 2. The TNO will contact the Fire Chief and Senior Staff and brief them on the change in the Threat Level and provide the following information:
 - The National Threat Level
 - The City-wide OPCON level
 - San Diego Fire-Rescue OPCON level by division
 - San Diego Police OPCON level
 - Source of the information
 - Threat element (who)



- Nature of the threat
- Target
- Time of the attack/event
- Estimated impact of the attack/event
- Actions taken by outside agencies
- 3. The TNO will contact the FCC and direct them to send a page to all paging systems (city system, Blackberry) informing the workforce that a change in the National and/or San Diego Fire-Rescue OPCON level has occurred.
 - a. Content of the page
 - There has been a change in a threat level
 - The National Threat Level
 - The City-wide OPCON Level
 - The SDFD OPCON Level
 - Actions to take
 - Check email for more detailed information

Workforce Notification Page Examples

"This is notification that the national threat level has changed. The national threat level is: high. The city-wide OPCON level is: alpha. The SDFD OPCON level is: alpha. Actions: review OPCON guidelines. Check email for more info".

- b. Groups to be paged
 - Staff
 - Operations
 - Lifeguards
 - US&R
- 4. The TNO will contact the FCC and direct them to send an email informing the workforce that a change in the National and/or San Diego Fire-Rescue OPCON level has occurred.
 - a. Content of the email
 - There has been a change in a threat level
 - What the new threat levels are
 - Nature of the threat
 - Actions to take



Workforce Notification Email Examples

Subject: Change in the National Threat Level

Content: Threat Level

This is notification that the National Threat Level has changed. The National Threat Level was at "Elevated" but has now been changed to "High". The City-wide OPCON Level remains at "Elevated". The SDFD OPCON Level remains at "Elevated".

Nature of threat

Threats against international flights into the U.S. There was specific intelligence that terrorists may attempt to hijack incoming international flights for the purpose of using the aircraft to attack high value targets.

Actions

Review the OPCON guidelines contained in SI 12 of the Operations Manual with all employees. Ensure the workplace Threat Level placards reflect the current threat levels.

- b. Groups to email
 - !SDFD All Captains
 - !SDFD All FCC
 - !SDFD Battalion Chiefs
 - !SDFD Dispatch Management Team
 - !SDFD Dispatch Supervisors
 - SDFD PIO
 - !SDFD Senior Staff
 - !SDFD Battalion Chiefs
 - US&R

D. <u>Workforce Response to Notification</u>

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1. All supervisors will review both the General Operational Condition Guidelines in Special Instruction 12, Section II, and the Workplace Placard for their workplace.



- 2. Supervisors will brief their employees on the Threat Level change, the checklists in the General Operational Condition Guidelines and the Workplace Placard.
- 3. Each supervisor will be responsible for ensuring that all actions in the General Operational Condition Guidelines and the Workplace Placard are carried out immediately.

Emergency Levels

The San Diego Fire-Rescue Department Operations Center Manual identifies the following three Levels of Emergencies:

Level I

A minor to moderate incident where local resources are adequate and available. A Local Emergency may or may not be proclaimed.

Level II

A moderate to severe emergency wherein local resources are not adequate and mutual aid may be required on a regional or even statewide basis. A Local Emergency will be proclaimed and a State Of Emergency might be proclaimed.

Level III

Major disasters where resources in or near the impacted area are overwhelmed and extensive state and/or federal resources are required. A Local Emergency and a State Of Emergency will be proclaimed and a Presidential Declaration of Emergency or Major Disaster will be requested.

Federal Authority

The federal government exercises preeminent authority and responsibility in crisis management. The federal crisis management effort is led by the FBI with assistance from other federal, state, and local agencies as necessary. Final authority to make decisions on scene regarding the causes of the incident such as securing the scene perimeter, identifying and rendering weapons safe, and capturing terrorists rests with the FBI's On Scene Commander (FBI OSC).

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Organization

The FBI will establish a command post near the site which will serve as the base for crisis management operations at the scene. The FBI will also establish a Joint Operations Center (JOC) to manage and coordinate the federal field response. The JOC is organized into a Command Group, Operations Group, Consequence Management Group, and the Support Group. The Command Group consists of the FBI, Department of Defense (DOD), Public Health Service (USPHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and other federal, state, and local representatives the FBI On Scene Commander (OSC) considers essential for managing the incident. The Operations Group handles threat evaluation, law enforcement actions, and technical evaluations and actions relating to the terrorists and their weapons. The Consequence Management Group consists of federal, state, and local agency liaisons who coordinate consequence management preparation and response with their respective agencies during threats and actual incidents. The Support Group provides support to all aspects of the federal terrorism response in the JOC. The FBI OSC will establish these functions.

Crisis Management

The federal concept of operations for terrorism response includes crisis management and consequence management. Crisis management is the law enforcement response to the causes of terrorist incidents, terrorists, and their weapons. It includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, isolate, prevent, and or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. In a weapon of mass destruction / nuclear, biological, chemical (WMD / NBC) incident, a crisis management response may include traditional law enforcement missions, such as intelligence, surveillance, tactical, negotiations, forensics, and investigations relating to apprehending the terrorists; and technical support missions, such as agent identification, search, disablement, transfer and disposal, and limited decontamination relating to the terrorist's weapons.

Consequence Management

Consequence management addresses the consequences of terrorism, the effects upon people and their property and communities. It includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. In a WMD / NBC incident, consequence management includes emergency management missions as described in the National Response Plan (NRP).



Interrelationship of Crisis and Consequence Management

Crisis and Consequence Management occur simultaneously during a threat or actual incident. While a threat is being evaluated for credibility, consequence management agencies can begin evaluating what actions can be taken to prepare for a credible threat. These activities may include activating plans and pre-positioning personnel, materials, and supplies.

General Resource Requests

Requests for emergency resources for response and recovery efforts will go through the same ordering process as used on a normal basis. For Fire specific requests, Incident Commanders will contact FCC. FCC will contact the Zone Coordinator. If the order can't be filled, they will call the Area Fire Coordinator. The principle is to have requests originate at the lowest level of government and be progressively forwarded to the next level until filled. For specialized orders other than Fire, the IC will contact the DOC with the request. DOC staff will forward the request to the EOC. EOC staff will work on getting the order filled through the Operational Area and contact the DOC with an ETA. DOC staff will pass the information on to the IC.

Requests for State and Federal Resources

Incident Commanders will contact the DOC with the request (other than fire). DOC staff will contact the EOC who will in turn contact the Operational Area (County OES). The Operational Area has responsibility for getting the order filled and contacting the EOC with an ETA.

The FBI is the single point of contact for accessing all federal assets. Due to the significant "reflex time" inherent to resource authorization, activation, mobilization and deployment of many of these assets, it is assumed the federal assets requested will not be on scene for at least several hours. Limited interim assistance may be made available from local military assets, subject to approval by each command at the time of need. All City requests for federal resources will go from the EOC to the Operational Area. The OA will contact the FBI.

Joint Operations

An act of terrorism with severe impact on the City will require a multi-agency response. The City Emergency Operations Center will be activated with high ranking officials representing each of the agencies involved. This executive level group will make policy decisions relating to the event and support field operations as appropriate. An Incident

SDFD




Command Post(s) or Unified Command Post(s) will be established at the field level to manage the incident.

Joint Information Center

A Joint Information Center (JIC) will be established at an appropriate location. It will be staffed with representatives from each of the involved agencies. Public Information Officers will provide discipline specific incident information to the overall report to be released. The FBI will have final approval regarding what is released. Any incident information deemed sensitive or that in any way could hinder the investigation will not be released.











THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO

STRONG MAYOR MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE




SDFD







San Diego Fire-Rescue Department Operations Center





Appendix A

Acronyms

A

ABLE	Airborne Law Enforcement (SDPD)
AFRCC	Air Force Rescue Coordination Center
AGCA	Associated General Contractors of America, Inc.
ALS	Advanced Life Support
APCD	Air Pollution Control District
AFC	Area Fire Coordinator
AID	Agency for International Development
ARB	Air Resources Board
ARC	American Red Cross
ARES	Amateur Radio Emergency Service
ARRL	American Radio Relay League
ASTREA	Aerial Support to Regional Enforcement Agencies (Sheriff's Helicopters)

B

BCABuilding Contractors AssociationBLSBasic Life Support

<u>C</u>

CAC	County Administration Center
CALTRANS	California Department of Transportation
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CAP	Civil Air Patrol
CANG	California Air National Guard
CB	Citizen's Band Radio
CCC	California Conservation Corps
CCP	Casualty Collection Point
CCW	Clean Coastal Waters
CD	Civil Defense
CDF	California Department of Forestry
CDMG	California Division of Mines and Geology
CDP	City Disaster Preparedness
CFS	Cubic Feet (per) Second
CHEMTREC	Chemical Transportation Emergency Center
CHP	California Highway Patrol
CIF	Construction Industry Federation
CLEMARS	California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Radio System



CLETS	California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System
CNG	California National Guard
CNPSERP	County Nuclear Power Station Emergency Response Plan
COC	County Operations Center
COE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
COMNAVBASE	Commander, Naval Base San Diego
COMSUBPACREP,	Commander, Submarines, Pacific Representative West Coast
CPG	Civil Preparedness Guide
CSTI	California Specialized Training Institute
CWA	County Water Authority

D

DAC	Dept. of Animal Control (County) - See Annex O
DAC	Disaster Application Center
D&C	Direction and Control - Management
DAT	Disaster Action Teams
DIS	Department of Information Services
DFG	Department of Fish & Game
DFO	Disaster Field Office
DHR	Department of Human Resources
DHS	Department of Health Services (County)
DDA	Detailed Damage Assessment
DOC	Department Operations Center
DOC	Department of Commerce
DOD	Department of Defense
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
DOEd	Department of Education
DHHS	Department of Health and Human Services
DHUD	Department of Housing and Urban Development
DOI	U.S. Department of Interior
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOL	Department of Labor
DOSs	Department of State
DOT	Department of Transportation
DPLU	Department of Planning and Land Use (County)
DPW	Department of Public Works
DSA	Disaster Support Area
DSR	Damage Survey Report
DSS	Department of Social Services
DSW	Disaster Service Worker
DWI	Disaster Welfare Inquiry
DWR	Department of Water Resources (State)
	-

SDFD



E

EAS	Emergency Alert System
EBS	Emergency Broadcast System
ECC	Emergency Communications Center
EDD	Employment Development Department
EIC	Emergency Information Center
EIZ	Emergency Information Zone (SONGS)
EMA	Emergency Management Assistance
EMMA	Emergency Managers Mutual Aid
EMI	Emergency Management Institute
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
EMT	Emergency Medical Technician
ENC	Emergency News Center (SONGS)
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOF	Emergency Operating Facility (SONGS)
EOP	Emergency Operations Plan
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
EPI	Emergency Public Information
EPIC	Emergency Public Information Center
EPZ	Emergency Planning Zone (SONGS)
ERT	Emergency Response Team
ERT	Environmental Response Team
EVAC	Emergency Volunteer Air Corps

F

FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FAS	First Aid Station
FAST	Federal Agency Support Teams
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCC	Federal Communications Commission
FCO	Federal Coordinating Officer
FD	Fire Department
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FHWA	Federal Highway Administration
FIA	Federal Insurance Administration
FIRMARS	Fire Incident Response Mutual Aid Radio System
FPD	Fire Protection District
FWS	U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service

<u>GH</u>

GAR	Governor's Authorized Representative
GSA	General Services Administration



HAZMAT	Hazardous Materials
H/CD	Housing and Community Development (County)
HIRT	HAZMAT Incident Response Team
HMMD	Hazardous Materials Management Division
HSAS	Homeland Security Advisory System
HST	Health Services Team
HUD	Department of Housing and Urban Development

Ī

IBWC	International Boundary and Water Commission
IC	Incident Commander
ICBO	International Conference of Building Officials
ICC	Interstate Commerce Commission
ICP	Incident Command Post
ICS	Incident Command System
IFG	Individual and Family Grants
IMA	Individual Mobilization Augmentee
IPC	Interjurisdictional Planning Committee (SONGS)
IPZ	Ingestion Pathway Zone (SONGS)
IRS	Internal Revenue Service

JK

JIC	Joint Information Center
JNACC	Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Committee
JEOC	Joint Emergency Operating Center
KI	Potassium Iodide

L

LIFELifesaving Information for Emergencies Alerting SystemLFALead Federal Agency

M

MASA	Mutual Aid Staging Area
MACS	Multi-Agency Command System
MCAS	Marine Corps Air Station
MCC	Mass Care Center
MEDMARS	Medical Mutual Aid Radio System
MHFP	Multihazard Functional Plan
MMST	Metropolitan Medical Strike Team
MOBDES	Mobilization Designees (now called IMAs)
MSA	Multipurpose Staging Area



MSL MWD Mean Sea Level Metropolitan Water District of Southern California

N

NAS	Naval Air Station
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
	1
NASAR	National Association of Search and Rescue
NAWAS	National Warning System
NCS	National Communications Systems
NDMS	National Disaster Medical System
NEST	Nuclear Emergency Support Team
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NOSC	Naval Ocean Systems Center
NRAD	Naval Research and Development
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRT	National Response Team
NWS	National Weather Service
NUREG	Nuclear Regulatory Commission Publication

<u>0</u>

OA	Operational Area	
OASIS	Operational Area Satellite Information System	
ODAC	Off-site Dose Assessment Center (SONGS)	
OES	Office of Emergency Services (Operational Area)	
OES	Office of Emergency Services (State)	
OPM	Office of Personnel Management	
OSC	On-Scene Coordinator	

<u>P</u>

PAG	Protection Action Guides		
PCE	Principle Civil Engineer		
PD	Police Department		
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive		
PDA	Preliminary Damage Assessment		
PIO	Public Information Officer		
PL 920	Public Law 920, 81st Congress, Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950		
PL 93_288	Public Law 288, 93rd Congress, Disaster Relief Act of 1974		
PPP	Population Protection Planning		
PSA	Public Service Announcement		
PSI	Pounds Per Square Inch		
PST	Pacific Strike Team		



QR

RACES	Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service		
RADEF	Radiological Defense		
RADMON	Radiological Monitoring		
RAT	Radiological Assistance Team		
RATCF	Radar Air Traffic Control Facility (Miramar)		
RCS	Road Crew Supervisor		
RCS	Regional Communications System		
RDMHC	Regional Disaster Medical Health Coordinator		
RDO	Radiological Defense Officer		
REACT	Radio Emergency Associated Citizen Teams		
REOC	Regional Emergency Operations Center		
REM	Radiation Equivalent in Man		
RHB	State Department of Health Services, Radiological Health Branch		
RIMS	Response Information Management System		
RMO	Radiological Monitor Operator		
RO	Radiological Officer		
RRT	Regional Response Team		
RUIS	Regional Urban Information System		
RWQCB	Regional Water Quality Control Board		

<u>S</u>

SAC	Special Agent in Charge (FRI)		
5.10	Special Agent in Charge (FBI)		
SAC	State Agency Coordinator		
SAR	Search and Rescue		
SAROC	Search and Rescue of the Californias (Baja California)		
SBA	Small Business Administration		
SCE	Southern California Edison		
SCO	State Coordinating Officer		
SDG&E	San Diego Gas and Electric		
SDO	Staff Duty Officer		
SEMS	Standardized Emergency Management System		
SO	Sheriff's Office		
SOA	State Operating Authority		
SOC	State Operations Center		
SOCALEDISON	Southern California Edison		
SONGS	San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station		
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure		
SM	Scene Manager		
SSCOT	State Strategic Committee on Terrorism		
SWRCB	State Water Resources Control Board		



T

TCP	Traffic Control Points	
TEP	Temporary Evacuation Point	
TSDF	Treatment, Storage and Disposal Facilities	
TREAS	Department of the Treasury	
TVA	Tennessee Valley Authority	

U

UDC	Unified Disaster Council		
URC	Unified Radio Council		
USA	United States Army		
USAF	United States Air Force		
US&R	Urban Search And Rescue		
USCG	United States Coast Guard		
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture		
USDCESO	Unified San Diego County Emergency Services Organization		
USGS	United States Geological Survey		
USMC	United States Marine Corps		
USN	United States Navy		
USPS	United States Postal Service		

<u>VWXYZ</u>

VA	Department of Veterans Affairs	
VSC	Volunteer Services Coordinator	



Appendix B

Definitions

Administrative Order: A formal document negotiated by the Director of OES with a state agency that details the responsibilities and activities that a state agency may be required to perform through the phases of an emergency or a disaster. It is an extension of Governor's Executive Order W-9-91 which establishes basic emergency preparedness objectives and policies to be carried out by state officials. It also provides a basis for a state agency to perform emergency planning, develop emergency plans and procedures, train its employees, and engage in exercises and drills.

<u>Agency Representatives</u>: An individual assigned to an incident command post or emergency operations center from another agency. The agency representative should be able to speak for his/her agency within established limits and facilitate requests for information and assistance to his/her agency.

<u>California Emergency Organization</u>: Civil government organized and augmented or reinforced during an emergency by auxiliaries, volunteers, persons pressed into service, the private sector, and community based organizations.

<u>Consequence Management</u>: The management of federal, state, and local assets which will respond to any terrorist incident that has the potential for generating mass casualties or destruction. This includes appropriate planning and response efforts in concert with law enforcement crisis management efforts.

<u>Crisis Management</u>: Measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. The federal government has primary authority to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism. State and local government provide assistance if required. Crisis management is primarily a law enforcement response. It may be supported by technical operations and consequence management which may operate concurrently.

Emergency Operations Center: A location from which centralized emergency management can be performed.

Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center: An operations center usually established near the scene of a radiological emergency from which the federal field monitoring and assessment assistance is directed and coordinated.

SDFD



<u>Field Emergency Operations Center</u>: A facility near the scene of a radiological emergency from which the California Department of Health Services field emergency coordinator provides radiological support to local governments.

Joint Operations Center: The center established by, and under the direction of the FBI at or near the site of event that serves as the nucleus for the decision-making, coordination, and overall management of ongoing operations. The JOC is an expansion of the onscene FBI Command Post.

Lead Federal Agency: The federal agency which is responsible for leading and coordinating all aspects of a federal radiological response pursuant to the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan. It is determined by the type of emergency. In situations where a federal agency owns, authorizes, regulates, or is otherwise deemed responsible for the facility or radiological activity causing the emergency and has authority to conduct and manage federal actions onsite, is normally the LFA. The LFA may be the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy, Department of Defense, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, or the Environmental Protection Agency.

Liaison Officer: The main point of contact and coordinator for providing support to Agency Representatives.

<u>Major Consequences</u>: Consequences that exceed the state and local authorities capabilities and require a federal consequence management response.

<u>National Defense Area</u>: An area established on non-federal lands, within the US, to safeguard classified defense information or to protect Department of Defense equipment or material. Establishing a National Defense Area occurs only in an emergency and places the defined area under the control of the Department of Defense.

<u>National Security Area</u>: An area established on non-federal lands, within the US, to safeguard classified information or to protect Department of Energy or National Aeronautics and Space Administration equipment or material. Establishing a National Security Area occurs only in an emergency and places the defined area under the control of the Department of Energy.

<u>Significant Threat</u>: The confirmed presence of an explosive device or WMD capable of causing a significant destructive event, prior to actual injury or property loss.

<u>Terrorist Incident</u>: A violent act, or an act dangerous to human life, in violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: (A) Any destructive device as defined in section 921 of Title 18 U.S.C., any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas, bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, missile having an explosive or incendiary charge



of more than one quarter ounce, mine or device similar to the above; (B) poison gas; (C) any weapon involving a disease organism; or (D) any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life.



Appendix C

Specialized Resources

<u>Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT)</u> Medical team of volunteer doctors, nurses, paramedics, emergency medical technicians and support personnel capable of emergency care, primary care, and health outreach.

<u>Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams (MMST)</u> Teams based in four California cities: San Diego, Los Angeles, San Jose, and San Francisco. They have a specialized medical supply cache stored locally of particular medicines and antidotes. The teams can respond to local, regional, or statewide events and can be activated locally or through the state's mutual aid system. They can assist in medical management of contaminated victims, perform technical consultation, provide medical intelligence about the incident, and interact with law enforcement.

<u>Poison Control Centers</u> Poison Control Centers provide human poison exposure and medical/health related information to responders and hospitals. Each center is staffed by Poison Information Specialists 24-hours a day. They have an extensive toxicology library and immediate access to consultants. These Centers may know the capability of each hospital in its coverage area.

Railroad Accident Prevention and Immediate Deployment (RAPID) Force This group of state agencies is available for responding to surface transportation accidents involving hazardous materials. RAPID force agencies can provide technical support in the areas of environmental fate, human health effects, cleanup technology, and laboratory services.

<u>Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR)</u> This unit of the Department of Health and Human Services is available to help assess public health threats posed by an incident, provide advice on personnel protective measures within the response area, respond to health complaints, and provide advice on the need to relocate nearby residents. Members are located in each USEPA regional office and are accessed through the EPA On Scene Coordinator.

<u>Chemical/Biological Rapid Deployment Team (CBRDT)</u> This is a chemical/biological terrorist incident response team providing medical and health care, technical assistance, radiological and environmental monitoring, and explosives disposal. The team consists of members from the USPHS, DOD, USEPA, and DOE. It is led by the USPHS.

<u>Department of Energy Accident Response Group (ARG)</u> A group of technical and scientific experts composed of DOE and DOE contractor personnel assigned responsibility for providing DOE response to peacetime accidents and significant incidents involving nuclear weapons anywhere in the world.

<u>Department of Energy Aerial Measuring System (AMS)</u> This system utilizes aircraft (helicopters and fixed winged aircraft) located in Washington DC and Las Vegas, Nevada, which can respond to radiological emergencies. Its capabilities include aerial search and photographic surveys,



radiation (utilizing gamma spectroscopy) and multi-spectral scanning surveys, and real-time radiological aerial air sampling.

Department of Energy Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) This resource provides real-time computer predictions of the dispersion of radioactivity from a nuclear incident. It provides maps showing accumulated dose, airborne concentration, and contamination distribution. This resource is located at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

<u>Department of Energy Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST)</u> A group of DOE and DOE contractor/laboratory scientists, engineers, and technicians who develop and maintain special equipment and procedures for deploying search, identification, diagnostic, disablement, damage mitigation, and other specialized support capabilities in response to lost or stolen nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials, to nuclear explosive threats, and to radiation dispersal threats.

<u>Department of Energy Radiological Assistance Program (RAP)</u> This unit serves as the initial DOE radiological emergency responder. It can assist in identifying the presence of radioactive contamination on personnel and equipment, and at the incident site; and provide advice on personnel monitoring, decontamination, and material recovery. Its equipment includes hand-held radiation detectors, air monitors, anti-contamination clothing, and communications equipment.

<u>Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT)</u> In addition to the teams located in California, other DMAT teams from around the country can be activated and deployed by the federal government to respond to events in California.

<u>Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST)</u> The mission of this team is to provide advice and assistance to the FBI On Scene Commander related to the capabilities of the DEST agencies and to coordinate follow-on activities.

<u>Environmental Response Team (ERT)</u> The ERT has expertise in treatment technology, biology, chemistry, hydrology, geology, and engineering. The ERT can provide access to special decontamination equipment for chemical releases and advice to the FOSC in hazard evaluation; risk assessment; multimedia sampling and analysis program; on-site safety, including development and implementation plans; cleanup techniques and priorities; water supply decontamination and protection; application of dispersants; environmental assessment; degree of cleanup required; and disposal of contaminated material.

<u>Federal On Scene Coordinator (FOSC)</u> The FOSC is predestinated by USEPA for inland areas and the USCG for coastal or major navigable waterways. FOSCs coordinate all federal environmental containment, removal, disposal efforts, and resources during an incident.

<u>Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC)</u> This center, managed by the DOE out of the Nevada Operations Office, coordinates federal off-site radiological monitoring and assessment activities for a nuclear incident. It provides the lead federal agency and the state with coordinated and quality controlled evaluation and interpretation of radiological monitoring and assessment data.



<u>National Disaster Medical System (NDMS)</u> The National Disaster Medical System includes the DMATs and the NMRTs, and also includes patient evacuation and transportation nationwide into definitive inpatient care. This system can be accessed to respond to terrorist incidents.

<u>National Medical Response Teams (NMRT)</u> There are three of these augmented DMATs located across the country (one in Los Angeles), specially trained and equipped to respond to terrorist incidents and deployable to assist local response efforts within a short time frame.

Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) This is an on-call team of physicians, health physicists, coordinators, and support staff located at Oak Ridge Associated Universities who can provide consultation or direct medical and radiological assistance in the field. Specific areas of expertise include medical and radiological triage, decontamination procedures and therapies, diagnostic and prognostic assessments of radiation injuries, and radiation dose estimates.

<u>Radiological Emergency Response Teams (RERTs)</u> EPA's Office of Radiation Programs (ORP) can provide response and support for incidents or sites

containing radiological hazards. Expertise is available in radiation monitoring, radionuclide analysis, radiation health physics, and risk assessment. RERTs can provide on-site support, including mobile monitoring laboratories for field analyses of samples and fixed laboratories for radiochemical sampling and analyses. Requests for support may be made 24-hours a day via the NRC or directly to the EPA Radiological Response Coordinator in the Office of Radiation Programs. Assistance is also available from DOE and other federal agencies.

<u>Response Task Force-West (RTF-W)</u> This is a US 5th Army Command and Control unit responsible for providing coordination of all Department of Defense assets that may respond to a request for assistance from the FBI or FEMA. It will utilize Defense Coordinating Officers and other personnel to provide military support to civilian authorities. It is based at Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio, Texas.

<u>Scientific Support Coordinators (SSC)</u> The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration provides SSCs to assist the FOSC by providing expertise in environmental chemistry, oil slick tracking, pollutant transport modeling, and natural resources at risk.

<u>Superfund Technical Assistance and Response Team (START)</u> A private contractor who provides technical assistance in the form of engineering, scientific, technical, managerial, administrative, and information management support for USEPA's emergency response, removal, and prevention program.

<u>US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases</u> This laboratory is under the US Army Medical Research and Material Command, with capability to respond to a threat or actual incident involving biological agents or materials. Its Aeromedical Isolation Team is composed of physicians, nurses, medical assistants, and laboratory technicians who are specially trained to



provide care to and transport patients with disease caused by either biological warfare agents or by infectious diseases requiring high containment.

<u>US Army Research Institute for Chemical Defense</u> The Institute is responsible for the discovery, development, testing, and evaluation of medical treatments and material to prevent and treat casualties of chemical warfare agents.

<u>US Army Technical Escort Unit</u> This unit provides worldwide escort, neutralization, disposal, and emergency response to toxic chemicals, munitions, and other hazardous materials. Its personnel are trained in chemical, biological, and explosive ordnance disposal operations.

<u>US Coast Guard National Strike Force (NSF)</u> The NSF is composed of the three USCG Strike Teams, including the Pacific Strike Team, and the National Strike Force Coordination Center. The NSF is available to assist FOSCs in their preparedness and response duties.

<u>US Coast Guard Pacific Strike Team</u> Trained personnel and specialized equipment available to assist the FOSC in stabilizing and containing the spill, and in monitoring or directing response actions. It is a component of the NSF.

<u>US Coast Guard District Response Group (DRG)</u> The entity within each USCG district consisting of the combined USCG personnel and equipment, including marine firefighting equipment of each port in the district; additional pre-positioned response equipment; and a district response advisory team.

<u>US Marine Corps Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force</u> This standing consequence management force is tailored to respond to terrorist initiated chemical and biological incidents.

<u>US Navy Medical Research Institute</u> The Institute provides basic and applied research in infectious diseases and environmental medicine. The program has a deployable laboratory capability.



Appendix D

WMD Agents, Effects and Potential Resource Requests

The information below lists various Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosion (CBRNE), Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): 1) Agents; 2) Effects on the Human Body, and 3) Potential Resource Requests that may be initiated through the OA EOC. This list contains general information and is <u>not intended to be all-inclusive.</u>

The "Potential Resource Requests" referenced below have been incorporated and addressed in the four Readiness/Response Phases and Activities of the CONOPS. The intent is to: 1) Identify and anticipate these Potential Resource Requests, 2) Identify resources availability, 3) Monitor the usage and depletion of resources by emergency workers and public decontamination efforts, and 4) Anticipate and request replacement of exhausted resources through Mutual-Aid, State and Federal avenues.

I. Chemical Agents:

TYPES:	Hydrogen Cyanide (AC)	
1 1 1 L .S.		
	• Sulfur Mustard (H, HD)	
	• Lewisite (L)	
	• Sarin (GB)	
	• Phosgene (CG)	
	Chlorine (CL)	
EFFECTS:	AC poisons the central nervous system	
	• H, HD & L cause burns and blisters on all unprotected areas	
	GB constricts muscles causing spasms	
	• CG, CL cause fluid to build up in the lungs	
	Left untreated, all can cause death	
POTENTIAL	• Atropine is a common antidote for organophosphates such as sarin. It	
RESOURCE	can be found in most hospital emergency rooms and county poison	
REQUESTS:	control centers. Active duty military units are also a source of atropine	
	auto injectors.	
	• 2 PAM chlorides, in conjunction with atropine, is an antidote for nerve	
	agents. It is not common outside the military. Military units have	
	supplies.	
	• Respiratory protection such as Self Contained Breathing Apparatus	
	(SCBA) and other respiratory protection devices and protective over	
	garments such as Level "A" suits can be found with fire departments and	
	HAZMAT teams at the local level.	
	• Decontamination showers are also standard equipment for HAZMAT	
	teams.	
	• Ventilators for patient care which is standard equipment at hospitals.	
	• Detection devices for weaponized chemicals and personnel trained in	
	their use can be found in active duty military units.	



II. Biological Agents:

TYPES:	Anthrax	
	Plague	
	• Botulism	
EFFECTS:	Few symptoms upon exposure	
	• Within 8-12 hours; Flu like symptoms; weakness, fever and	
	abdominal pain	
	• Left untreated, death within 24-72 hours.	
POTENTIAL	• Unlikely to receive resource requests upon initial exposure since	
RESOURCE	initial symptoms resemble the flu.	
REQUESTS:	• Resource requests would generally follow the existence of an	
	outbreak of similar symptoms.	
	• Respiratory protection such as Self Contained Breathing Apparatus	
	(SCBA) and other respiratory protection devices and protective over	
	garments such as Level A suits that are standard equipment for	
	HAZMAT teams at the local level.	
	• Decontamination showers are also standard equipment for HAZMAT	
	teams.	
	• Ventilators for patient care which is standard equipment at hospitals.	

III. Nuclear Incidents:

TYPES:	Radiation Dispersion Device	
	Improvised Nuclear Device	
EFFECTS:	 RDD Combines radiological material (i.e. radioactive medical waste) with a dispersion device (i.e. explosives) to spread radiological material. IND is a device that produces a nuclear explosion. Both can produce radiation sickness, burns, and death. They can also contaminate the area in which they detonate with radiological particles (fallout). 	
POTENTIAL	• Radiological measuring devices that can be found through the State	
RESOURCE	OES radiological program, and the CHP. Nuclear Power Plants are	
REQUESTS:	also a source of radiological detection devices.	
	 Radiological Personnel Protective Equipment such as over garments and respirators can be found through the State radiological program and from Nuclear Power Plants. Decontamination showers that are standard equipment for HAZMAT. 	
	• Decontamination showers that are standard equipment for HAZMAT teams.	



IV. Explosions With or Without The Presence Of WMD Agents

POTENTIAL	• Earth moving and heavy equipment to remove debris and	
RESOURCE	support/repair damaged structures can be located via the National	
REQUESTS:	Guard. In addition, an agreement known as Plan Bulldozer can be	
	used to provide private vendor equipment.	
	• Urban Search & Rescue (US&R) teams with search dogs can be	
	provided through fire mutual aid.	
	• Facilities to support first responders such as portable lavatories and	
	on scene and fixed shelters can be located through private vendors.	



Appendix E

Outside Agency Contacts and Twenty-Four Hour Numbers

Agency	Telephone Number
County Office of Emergency Services	(858) 565-3490
Federal Bureau of Investigation	(858) 565-1255
Harbor Police Department	(619) 686-6272
Navy Region Southwest	(619) 524-5503
San Diego Gas & Electric	(619) 725-5100
San Diego Police Department (Watch Commander)	(619) 531-2205
State of California OES Warning Center	(916) 845-8911
Transportation Safety Administration	(619) 687-3188
United States Coast Guard	(619) 278-7033

Adjoining Cities

Agency	Telephone Number
Chula Vista	(619) 691-5151
Coronado	(619) 522-7350
Del Mar	(858) 756-5971
Escondido	(760) 839-4722
Imperial Beach	(619) 585-7232
La Mesa	(619) 441-1621
Lemon Grove	(619) 441-1621
National City	(619) 441-1621
Poway	(858) 974-9891 (SDFD FCC)
Santee	(619) 441-1621